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The advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) laid the
groundwork for negotiations to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
by  the  year  2010.  Western  Hemisphere  (WH)  market  integration  reduces  or
eliminates trade barriers among member countries, providing more open markets and
freer movement of investment capital across  national boundaries.  The formation and
expansion  of a  free  trade agreement  in  the  WH  increases  export  and  investment
opportunities  for agribusinesses  in member countries, particularly as the demand for
goods and services increases  with the growth in the number of consumers and their
corresponding  income levels.
One factor that may influence  the location of production  is trade policy.  In
December  1994,  Western  Hemisphere  (WH)  countries  met  in  Miami  to  begin
negotiations to establish a "Free Trade Area of the Americas"  (FTAA) by the year
2010.  These negotiations  closely followed the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement  (NAFTA)  and  the ratification of the Uruguay  Round under the
General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by 125 member nations.  While the
GATT is a world agreement that reduces trade barriers,  the NAFTA is a free trade
agreement that seeks to remove barriers to trade between the United States, Mexico,
and Canada over a 15-year time frame.
Thirty-two  WH  countries  participated  in  the Summit  of the Americas.  A
theme of the Summit was economic  integration to provide more open  markets and
freer movement of investment capital across national boundaries within the WH.  A
WH Free Trade Agreement would expand the NAFTA to include countries in Latin156  Proceedings
America,  the Caribbean,  and South America.  Several trading blocs have already emerged
within the  WH.
Agreements  among WH countries already  established include:  the Latin American
Integration Association (ALADI); Central  American Common  Market (Bolivia, Columbia,
Ecuador,  Peru,  Venezuela);  Caribbean  Community  and  Common  Market  (CARICOM);
Group  of Three  (Colombia,  Mexico,  Venezuela);  and  Southern  Cone  Common  Market
(MERCOSUR  - Argentina,  Brazil,  Paraguay,  and  Uruguay).  In  mid-1995,  Chile  was
negotiating for inclusion into NAFTA,  however,  incorporating  established trading blocs into
NAFTA  is  considered  simpler  than  adding  some  thirty-five  independent  countries
individually.
The  NAFTA  should  provide  Mexico  an  advantage  over  Latin  American  and
Caribbean countries  in their exports to the United  States.  Foreign direct investment (FDI)
also should be more attractive  in Mexico than in other Western Hemisphere (WH) countries
as  a  result  of the NAFTA.  For  these  reasons,  countries  in  the  WH  will  likely  seek
membership  in the NAFTA.
Purpose
The purpose here is to briefly review and provide some comments on the Robertson,
Stanbury, Kofler, and Monteiro manuscript entitled Competition Policy, Trade Liberalization
and Agriculture presented  at this Workshop.  An  additional  aspiration here  is to provide
some  focus  on  Mexico,  particularly  since  the  work  by  Robertson  et  al  provides  scant
comment  about Mexico.  As  a  final  agenda  item  and  because  this session  also  includes
investment,  the attention to Mexico focuses on the factors influencing investment,  including
some general economic  factors and Mexican  federal competition  and trade policy changes
which influence  foreign direct investment (FDI).
COMPETITION POLICY, TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  AND AGRICULTURE
The  lengthy  manuscript  by  Robertson  et  al.  offers  a  comprehensive  treatment  of
competition policy in North America.  On the whole, they view changes in trade policy,  as
embodied by GATT  and NAFTA,  as substantially influencing  industrial  and  competition
policies  in the United  States and Canada.  In their view, the broad result of these policies are
trade-offs where  economic efficiency  gains are made at the expense of national sovereignty.
They even refer to the influence of these policies as "collective  imperialism"  (Robertson,  et
al, p.  54).  This view is perhaps jaded given the global events which move toward capitalism
and away  from socialistic economic systems.
Robertson  et  al  also  assess,  in  some  detail, the  benefit  of Canada's  Competition
Bureau linkage with the United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.
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On  balance,  the  authors  conclude  that  the  enhanced  exchange  of  information  assists
Canadians  in their competition antitrust law enforcement.  The enhanced harmonization  or
cooperation and information exchange across national boundaries in terms of governments
is certainly a spillover effect of freer trade policies.
A  major  contribution  of this  paper  is  to provide  an  extensive  assessment  of the
Canadian  Competition Bureau relative to agriculture.  They provide the reader with detailed
information  concerning  the interventions  made by  the  Canadian  Bureau  of Competition
relative to agriculture.  They cite  197 total interventions  between  1975 and 1995.  Only 13
of these  interventions  involved  agriculture  or downstream firms  in the value added  food
chain.  The detail of these interventions provided in the manuscript  is useful to all students
of competition  policy.  However,  the  authors  may  under-value  the extent  of structural
adjustment that  will be occurring in agriculture  in the  Western Hemisphere over the  next
decade.
One  topic,  examined in notable  detail  in the  Robertson  et al manuscript, is merger
activity, especially in Canada.  The recurring theme here appears to be from the viewpoint
of prejudging merger activity, in the sense of the Canadian government either allowing the
merger or disallowing the merger on an ex ante basis.  It is interesting  to note that over the
last decade  or so, the United States government has adopted a permissive policy regarding
merger formation.  Concomitantly  the  United States has  been less permissive  in terms of
monitoring performance  of the merged companies.  The United States has evolved to a point
where  competition policy, at least with respect  to merger activity,  will allow mergers but
more  closely  monitor performance  of the resulting firm.  This appears  to be a substantial
difference in Canada and the United States regarding merger policy.
MEXICAN  COMPETITION POLICIES AND  FACTORS INFLUENCING  FDI
Robertson  et al pay scant attention  to Mexico.  The intent here is to provide some
focus on Mexico.  Robertson  et al provide much information and analysis concerning United
States  and  Canadian  competition policy.  However,  Mexico's  problem  is  not  so  much
competition policy as it is investment,  or lack thereof.  Thus, investment is an important part
of the emphasis  on Mexico provided here.
There  are  some widely  recognized  factors that influence  foreign direct investment
over time:
* General economic  conditions
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In this context,  it is prudent to examine national  laws relative to FDI.
Mexico's  economic  policy evolution  witnessed a major shift during the  1980s.  In
general,  government intervention  dramatically declined  and privatization  was encouraged.
Prior to the  1980s, some basic laws influenced foreign direct investment in Mexico.  These
included the  1) Land Tenure Law,  2) Article 27 of the  1926 Organic Law, and 3)  the  1973
Law to Promote Mexican  Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment.
Based  on the  Land Tenure  Law, Mexico  redistributed  massive landholdings.  The
1910 Mexican Revolution fostered the ejido system of collectively  held land.  Ejido land can
only be  inherited-  not bought,  sold, or rented.  Furthermore,  ejido land comprises about 75
percent of crop  area and 50 percent of the land area.
Article  27 of the  1926  Organic Law prohibited  stock corporations  from acquiring,
owning,  or operating  farms.  It also sets  legal limits on foreign  ownership of land.
The  1973 Law on Foreign Investment placed limits on foreign companies'  investment
in Mexican  enterprises.  Also, approval  for investment had to  be granted by the National
Commission of Foreign Investment.
The contemporary situation is that ejidos may now legally rent or sell their land due
to changes  in Mexico's laws in 1992.  Corporate farms may manage up to 2,500 hectares of
irrigated  land,  even  though  a  100-hectare  limitation  applies.  The  1989 Regulations on
Foreign Investment allowed  foreign investors  to hold  100 percent of a new enterprise  in
Mexico in "unrestricted"  economic activities.  However,  industrial projects still require prior
approval by the National Commission of Foreign Investment.
As part of the landscape  of Mexican competition  policy and  investment policy, the
Maquiladora  Program originally was used to circumvent strict laws  against FDI.  Originally
a maquiladora  company had to locate within 20 kilometers  of the U.S. border.  The situation
now, however,  is that maquiladoras  are mostly foreign-owned  businesses  with a home base
in the U.S., Japan,  Sweden,  France, Canada,  Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea.  They operate
under favorable customs treatment and liberal  FDI regulations  in order to promote exports
from Mexico.  Maquiladoras  import machinery, equipment,  and raw materials into Mexico
duty-free  and  value-added  products  are  exported.  The  Maquiladora  Program  has  been
liberalized over time.  A maquiladora company now may sell up to 30 percent of its output
in the domestic Mexican market and locate anywhere within Mexico except the urban areas
of Mexico City, Monterrey,  and Guadalajara.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  IN MEXICO
Investment by a company  or individual in new facilities, purchasing interest in whole
or part of an existing enterprise,  or purchasing land  in a country  outside the company  or
individual's home country  is considered to be FDI.  In  1994,  SECOFI, an official Mexican
government data source, estimated inbound FDI to be  $8.0 billion, a four-fold increase  since
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1984,  Figure  1.  Although  data  are  limited,  an  examination  of the  amount  of  direct
investment  by  sector  in  Mexico  is  also  interesting,  Figure  2.  The  amount  of  direct
investment  in Mexico from the U.S. in  1992 was at an  annual rate of US$  23.9 million.  Of
this, only US$  1.3 million,  or 5.4 percent,  was food sector investment.  The impact on FDI
of the liberalized federal  policies of Mexico are evident  in these time series data.
Figure 1.  Annual FDI in Mexico
CONCLUSIONS
Clearly,  Robertson  et  al.  have  made  a  significant  contribution  to  the  literature
regarding  competition policy  in Canada  and the  United  States.  Their detail and specific
accounting of interventions,  for example, catalogs  information that will be a useful reference
for a long time.
Also,  some  evidence  is presented  here  which  indicates  that FDI  is  important  in
investment  in  North  American  food  and  agricultural  industries.  As  a  consequence  of
NAFTA and other "free trade" agreements, substantial investment capital flows into Mexico.
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Significant structural  adjustment will occur, both in agriculture and value added food
industries.  For the most part, this structural adjustment will occur regardless  of competition
policy  in  Canada  or the  United  States.  Mexico  and  the  Western  Hemisphere  is headed
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Figure 2.  U.S.  DI in  Mexico  by Sector
REFERENCES
Robertson,  Gerald,  W.  T.  Stanbury,  Gernot Kofler,  and  Joseph  Monteiro.  "Competition
Policy,  Trade Liberalization,  and  Agriculture."  Paper presented  at the Policy and
Trade  Disputes  Workshop  entitled  Policy  Harmonization,  Convergence,  and
Compatibility  held in Tucson,  Arizona,  March 6-8,  1997.
SECOFI,  Direccion  General  de Inversion Extranjera.
160 ProceedingsIV.  APPLICATION TO SELECTED SECTORS
* Red Meats, Poultry and Dairy
* Grains and Oilseeds162  Proceedings